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Abstract. This paper provides a directed search model designed
to explain the residual part of wage variation left over after the
impact of education and other observable worker characteristics
has been removed. Workers have private information about their
characteristics at the time they apply for jobs. Firms value these
characteristics diﬀerently and can observe them once workers ap-
ply. They hire the worker they most prefer. However, the charac-
teristics aren’t contractible, so ﬁrms can’t condition their wages on
them. The paper shows how to extend arguments from directed
search to handle this, allowing for arbitrary distributions of worker
and ﬁrm types. The model is used to provide a functional relation-
ship that ties together the wage distribution and the wage-duration
function. This relationship provides a testable implication of the
model. This relationship suggests a common property of wage
distributions that guarantees that workers who leave unemploy-
ment at the highest wages also have the shortest unemployment
duration. This is in strict contrast to the usual (and somewhat
implausible) directed search story in which high wages are always
accompanied by higher probability of unemployment.
1. Introduction
This paper provides a directed search model in which worker and
ﬁrm characteristics diﬀer, but where ﬁrms cannot cannot condition
the wages they pay on worker characteristics as they can in papers
like in (Shi 2002) or (Shimer 2005). Examples of such characteristics
might be things like reference letters that convey a lot of information
about an applicants skill as long as they are not contractible. Another
example might be connections and friendships that workers have with
managers, or just with other workers in the industry. These connections
typically cannot be veriﬁed in any way that would be satisfactory in
a formal contract. Alternatively, ﬁrms may care a lot about worker
I am grateful to Daron Acemoglu, Rob Shimer and a number of referees for lot of
substantive and expositional help. The work on this paper was funded by SSHRC..
1characteristics on which they aren’t allowed to condition wages - for
example whether or not the worker has a criminal record, or a history
of union activism.
Workers know their own characteristics at the time they apply for
jobs, but they don’t know the characteristics of other workers who
might apply. Firms value these characteristics diﬀerently and can ob-
serve these characteristics once workers apply. Once they have collected
a bunch of applications, they hire the worker they most prefer.
The paper shows how to extend directed search to handle this, allow-
ing for arbitrary distributions of worker and ﬁrm types. More broadly,
this approach provides a method to understand the variation in wages
that cannot be attributed to observable characteristics. The basic logic
of the model ties together the wage distribution and the unemployment
duration function, i.e., the relationship between the wage at which a
worker leaves unemployment, and his duration. This relationship pro-
vides a potentially testable implication of the model.
The relationship between the wage duration function and the wage
distribution developed in this paper makes it possible to examine one
of the key predictions of directed search in models where wages can’t
be conditioned on worker type - workers who submit applications to
high wage ﬁrms should expect to be hired by those ﬁrms with low
probability.
1 There isn’t a lot of evidence about this central prediction,
however, what there is doesn’t seem to support it. Addison, Centeno,
and Portugal (2004), for example, provide some evidence to suggest
that the wages at which workers leave unemployment and the duration
of their unemployment spell are negatively correlated. The evidence is
not strong, but it certainly provides no support at all for the classical
prediction of directed search.
2
1For example (Peters 2000), (Lang, Manove, and Dickens 1999), (Eeckhout and
Kircher 2008),(Acemoglu and Shimer 2000) or (Shi 2009) all generate equilibrium
wage dispersion for which wage and employment probability are related in this way.
Of course, when wages can be made conditional on type, as in (Shi 2002) or (Shimer
2005), workers who receive higher wages are being compensated for having a more
valuable type, not for bearing risk, so no such relationship would be expected in
these models.
2Many models of directed search assume that workers and ﬁrms are identical, so
this assertion isn’t so much a prediction as it is a statement about what happens out
of equilibrium. However, there are many models that support distributions of wages
in equilibrium. For example, Shi (2002), Shimer (2005) and (Lang, Manove, and
Dickens 1999) all allow for a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent types of workers. In (Peters
2000) workers are identical, but there is a continuum of diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. In
Delacroix and Shi (2006) and (Shi 2009), workers equilibrium wages (and search
strategies) depend on their employment history. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman
2The argument below illustrates that the relationship between wage
and unemployment duration is driven by two considerations. The ﬁrst
is completely intuitive - higher wage ﬁrms will tend to hire workers
whose (externally unobservable) quality is higher, and these workers
will tend to be more likely to ﬁnd jobs no matter where they apply. This
creates a positive relationship between quality, employment probability
and wage. This is confounded by the fact that higher quality workers
will tend to use diﬀerent application strategies than low quality workers.
In particular, they will tend to apply at high wage jobs along with a
lot of other high quality workers. This eﬀect leads in the opposite
direction, lowering the probability with which high quality workers will
be hired. This is where the directed search model plays a role since
it ties down the application strategy for workers of diﬀerent qualities.
The characterization of the equilibrium application strategy provides a
testable connection between wage oﬀer distribution and the duration
function. One implication of this relationship is that it provides a
relatively simple (and apparently normally satisﬁed) restriction on the
wage distribution that ensures that workers who leave unemployment
at high wages tend to have shorter unemployment spells.
The paper begins with an analysis of the case where there is a con-
tinuum of workers and ﬁrms. The actions of individual ﬁrms support a
wage oﬀer distribution. Workers’ decisions support a joint distribution
of applications across wages and types. The payoﬀ functions resemble
those in a standard directed search model. Yet there is an important
diﬀerence. Instead of being concerned with the expected number of
competitors he will face when he applies at a given wage, a worker is
instead concerned with the expected number of competitors with higher
types.
For this reason, ﬁrms who set high wages don’t necessarily get more
applicants than low wage ﬁrms. However, the average quality of the
applicant they receive is higher and this compensates them for the
higher wages they commit themselves to pay. If ﬁrms diﬀer in the way
they value worker quality on the margin, then ﬁrms who like worker
quality will set higher wages. This will induce an imperfect matching
of high quality workers with ﬁrms who value that quality.
However, we show that this matching will be imperfect. The reason
is that equilibrium application strategies will have workers acting as if
(2006) or Galenianos and Kircher (2005) support wage distributions by allowing
multiple applications. Finally, other than the model described in the paper, the
only one I am familiar with that allows a continuum of both ﬁrm and worker types
is (Eeckhout and Kircher 2008). In all these models, the standard tradeoﬀ between
high wages and low employment probabilities occurs on the equilibrium path.
3they were following a ’reservation wage rule’ in which they apply with
equal probability to all ﬁrms who set wages above their reservation
wage. For this reason mismatches will continue, with high value em-
ployees remaining unemployed simply because they tried to compete
with other high quality employees and high producitivity ﬁrms ﬁll-
ing vacancies with low quality workers simply because no high quality
workers apply.
We provide a pair of functional equations that can be used to charac-
terize the equilibrium wage distribution and the equilibrium application
strategy of workers. We use these to illustrate the equilibrium with a
number of examples and to provide a condition that can be used to test
the model. We also revisit the relationship mentioned above between
unemployment duration and exit wage. From the arguments above, it
should be apparent that exit wages induce a selection bias - workers
who leave unemployment at high wages tend to be higher type workers
who don’t compete with the lower quality applicants who also apply
to high wage ﬁrms. As a consequence, there is no reason for them to
experience long unemployment spells. We use the functional equations
to compute the relationship between exit wage and average duration.
In general this relationship isn’t systematic. However, we provide a re-
striction on the wage distribution that ensures that workers who leave
unemployment at higher wages actually have higher employment prob-
abilities.
In the ﬁnal part of the paper, we focus on a micro foundation for the
model. This argument justiﬁes the particular payoﬀs used in the main
part of the paper. It also illustrates the result that workers should
follow a reservation wage strategy in choosing where to apply. We
consider a ﬁnite array of ﬁrms and wages and imagine a ﬁnite number
of workers with privately knows types who apply to these ﬁrms. We
characterize the unique symmetric Bayesian equilibrium application
strategy for workers. As mentioned, it involves a reservation wage,
then a set of application probabilities with which workers apply to
higher wage ﬁrms. As might be expected, the higher the wage (or the
farther away it is from the worker’s reservation wage) the lower the
probability that the worker applies. At that point, we explain why it
is that low type workers have to apply to high wage ﬁrms with some
probability in order to support the equilibrium. This, of course, rules
out assortative matching. One useful consequence of this argument is
to distinguish models like this one, where ﬁrms care about the type of
the worker they hire, from models like (Eeckhout and Kircher 2008)
where they don’t.
4Finally, we show explicitly how the payoﬀ functions in the Bayesian
equilibrium of the ﬁnite game converge to the payoﬀ functions we de-
scribed for the continuum model in the ﬁrst part of the paper as the
number of workers and ﬁrms grows large. In particular, we show how
large numbers appear to equalize the application probabilities across
ﬁrms. The limit theorems make it straightforward to show that pure
strategy equilibrium of the ﬁnite search game support allocations that
converge to the equilibrium allocations described in the ﬁrst part of the
paper.
A few papers from the literature are worth mentioning to put the
arguments here in context. Papers by (Shi 2002), and (Shimer 2005)
resemble this one in that matching of worker and ﬁrm types is not
assortative in equilibrium. They diﬀer from this paper in that they
allow ﬁrms to set wages that are conditional on the type of the worker
who they ultimately hire. As a consequence, the logic that breaks
down assortative matching is much diﬀerent than it is here. The exact
diﬀerences are easier to explain once the details of the model have been
made clearer, so the discussion of the diﬀerences is deferred to Section 8.
The papers by (Lang, Manove, and Dickens 1999) and (Eeckhout and
Kircher 2008) provide directed search models that support assortative
matching. In (Eeckhout and Kircher 2008) this is accomplished by
having ﬁrms declare the proﬁts they require rather than the wage they
pay.
3 This has the eﬀect of making the wage a worker receives from a
ﬁrm depend on the worker’s type. However, ﬁrms can’t control how the
wage varies with worker type, and this prevents them from adjusting
wages to ensure all types will want to apply. (Lang, Manove, and
Dickens 1999) is about racial discrimination, so there are only two
diﬀerent types of worker, which permits assortative matching. Again,
we defer discussion of this point until the model in this paper has been
described in more detail.
2. Fundamentals
A labor market consists of measurable sets M and N of ﬁrms and
workers respectively. We normalize the measure of the set of ﬁrms
to 1. The measure of the set of workers is assumed to be τ. Each





⊂ R+. These characteristics are observable to ﬁrms
once workers apply, but initially, they are private information to work-
ers. Let F be a diﬀerentiable and monotonically increasing distribution
3Of course, they don’t model it in this crude way - they consider a model in
which a ﬁrm sets the price that it wants from consumers.
5function. Assume that τF (y) is the measure of workers whose type is
less than or equal to y. These characteristics are assumed to be non-
contractible. Firms are not able to make wages vary directly with these
characteristics. A worker’s payoﬀ if he ﬁnds a job is simply the wage
he receives. If he fails to ﬁnd a job, his payoﬀ is zero. Workers are risk
neutral.
Firms characteristics are drawn from a set X = [x,x]. Let H (x) be
the measure of the set of ﬁrms whose characteristics are less than or
equal to x, with H (x) = 1 as described above. H is assumed integrable
with convex support. Each ﬁrm has a single job that it wants to ﬁll.
It chooses the wage that it wishes to pay the worker who ﬁlls this job.
Each ﬁrm’s wage is chosen from a compact interval W ⊂ R+. Payoﬀs
for ﬁrms depend on the wage they oﬀer and on the characteristic of
the worker they hire, and, of course, on their own characteristic. The
payoﬀ for every ﬁrm who hires a worker is v : W × Y × X → R where
x ∈ X is the ﬁrm’s type and y ∈ Y is the characteristic of the worker
whom she hires. It is assumed that v is continuously diﬀerentiable in
all its arguments, concave in w and bounded. To maintain an order
on ﬁrm types, it is assumed that for any pair (w,y) and (w′,y′) with
(w,y) ≥ (w′,y′), if v (w,y,x) ≥ v (w′,y′,x) for some type x, then
v (w,y,x′) ≥ v (w′,y′,x′) for any higher type x′ ≥ x. In words, this
single crossing condition says that higher type ﬁrms assign a higher
value to higher type workers. Finally, a ﬁrm who doesn’t hire receives
payoﬀ 0. We use the assumption that v ( ,0, ) = 0 uniformly, which
means that not hiring is treated the same way as hiring a worker with
type 0.
3. The Market
Each ﬁrm in the market commits to a wage. As is typically assumed
in directed search, each worker applies to one and only one ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm is assumed to hire the highest type applicant who applies. It is
assumed that a ﬁrm who advertises a job is committed to hire a worker
as long as some worker applies even if the ﬁrm’s perceived ex post payoﬀ
from the best worker who applies is negative.4 This assumption could
be defended by observing that all the applicants who apply to the ﬁrm
are veriﬁably qualiﬁed for the job being oﬀered. A refusal to hire any
applicant might be problematic for legal reasons, though, of course, no
ﬁrm is required to hire every qualiﬁed applicant who applies. However,
the assumption is primarily intended to simplify the limit arguments
4A high type ﬁrm who sets a high wage in order to attract high type workers
might not be willing to pay a low type worker that wage.
6given in the last section of the paper. The payoﬀ functions in the large
game described in this section can be modiﬁed in a straightforward way
to allow ﬁrms to decide not to hire when they have applicants.
The payoﬀs that players receive depend on their own actions, and on
the distributions of actions taken by the other players. We specify these
payoﬀs using standard arguments from directed search, then provide a
micro foundation in Section 8. Let G be the wage oﬀer distribution and
P the joint distribution of applications, where P (w,y) is understood
to be the measure of the set of workers of type y or less who apply
at wage w or less. We let pw (y) refer to the conditional distribution
function that describes the measure of the set of applicants of type less
than or equal to y who apply at wage w.
A worker of type y is always chosen over workers with lower types
wherever he applies. As a consequence, he is concerned not with the
total number of applicants expected to apply at the ﬁrm where he
applies (the ’queue size’), but with the measure of the set of applicants




We use the familiar formula e
−
R y
y dpw(˜ y) to give the probability of trade.5
This provides worker payoﬀs for wages in the support of G as




For ﬁrms, let w be a wage in the support of G. The payoﬀ from
employing such a worker is v (w,x,y). Integrating over the set of worker
types gives expected proﬁt







for any wage in the support of G.
In order to describe equilibrium, we need to deﬁne payoﬀs for both
workers and ﬁrms for wages that lie outside the support of G. In what
follows, let G mean the support of G. The notation w means the highest
wage in the support and w means the lowest wage in the support. We
can now deﬁne the payoﬀs using an argument similar to (Acemoglu and
Shimer 2000). Deﬁne






5We show below that this expression is the limit value of the matching probability
in a conventional urn-ball matching game.
7The function ω (y) is monotonic and continuous, so it is diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere. We refer to ω (y) henceforth as the market payoﬀ.
We assume, as do (Acemoglu and Shimer 2000) (among others), that
application strategies adjust so that for any wage w′  ∈ G all workers
whose market payoﬀ is less than w′ receive exactly their market payoﬀ
when they apply at w′, while all other workers receive payoﬀ w′. In
particular, we assume U (w′,y,G,P) = min[ω (y),w′]. For each wage
w′, we use the marginal distribution pw′that supports this property to
compute the ﬁrm’s proﬁt when it oﬀers such a wage.





y dpw′(y′) = ω (y)
on the support of pw′.
The solution for pw′ depends on whether w′ is above or below the
support of G.6 We discuss this brieﬂy here to illustrate the method,
and because the payoﬀ for wages above the support is surprising. In
the ﬁnal part of the paper, we show that these payoﬀs functions are
limits of payoﬀ functions in ﬁnite versions of the game.





, then (3.3) has no solution for any y and pw′should be





′) − log(ω (y)).
The diﬀerence between the logs can be written as the integral of its












The ﬁrm’s payoﬀ V (w′,x,G,P) is then given by substituting (3.4) into
(3.2).












This means that to satisfy the market payoﬀ condition, the distribution
pw′ must have an atom at y of size log(w′/w).
Heuristically, this means that when a ﬁrm sets a wage that is strictly
higher than every other wage in the support of the distribution of wages,
6We leave out the case where G has a non-convex support since it is very similar.
8it expects a set of applications from workers with the highest possible
type. From this group, the ﬁrm will select an applicant randomly. This
is just the usual matching problem in directed search. It is well known
that in this case that if k is the measure of the set of applicants of
the highest possible type, then each of them is oﬀered the job with
probability 1−e−k
k . The proﬁt that the seller earns from this atom of
applicants of the highest type is the measure of this set of applications,
log(w′/w), times the probability with which each of them is awarded
the job, 1−e− log(w′/w)
log(w′/w) , times the proﬁt per applicant, v (w′,y,x). So the






















With these deﬁnitions for proﬁts associated with wages outside the
support of G, the payoﬀ functions given by (3.1) and (3.2) now deﬁne
a large game in the sense that each player’s payoﬀ depends on his
own action and type as well as the distribution of actions of the other
players.7 Equilibrium is now deﬁned in the usual way by requiring
that the distribution of best replies to a distribution coincides with the
distribution itself.
Deﬁnition 3.1. An equilibrium of this game is a pair of distributions
G and P such that
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dP (w,y) = τ
4. Reservation Wages
We ﬁrst demonstrate that equilibrium application strategies must
satisfy a reservation wage property. Workers will eﬀectively pick the
lowest wage to which they will apply, then apply with equal probability
to all ﬁrms whose wages are higher.8
7For example, see (Mas-Colell 2002), (Mas-Colell 1975) or (Schmeidler 1973).
8The proof of the following Proposition was suggested by a referee.











where G− (ω (y)) = limx↑ω(y) G(x) and y∗ (w) = supy {y′ : ω (y′) ≤ w}.
Proof. First observe that by deﬁnition, ω (y) ≥ we
−
R y
y dpw(y′) for all w.
Then if w < ω (y) there is no no-negative distribution function pw for
which (3.7) could be satisﬁed. So pw (y) is constant for all y for which
w < ω (y). To prove the reservation wage property, we want to show
that if y is in the support of pw, then it is in the support of pw′for all
w′ > w. To accomplish this, we show the stronger result that w > ω (y)
implies that y is in the support of pw.
Suppose w > ω (y) for some pair (w,y). Observe ﬁrst that there
must be some set B of F positive measure such that y′ > y and y′ is in
the support of pw. If that weren’t true, then worker y would be hired
for sure at wage w, which would contradict w > ω (y). By condition






for almost all y′ ∈ B.
Now suppose there is also a subset B− which has strictly positive F-
measure, contains only types y′ ≥ y who have market payoﬀ ω (y′) > w,
but which is not contained in the support of pw. Then workers whose
types are in B don’t compete against workers whose types are in B−
when they apply at wage w. Yet for the same reason, workers whose
types are in B− don’t compete against other workers whose types are
in B− when they apply at wage w. Since almost all workers in B− are
supposed to apply at wage w with probability 0, there must be a pair








ω (y1) > ω (y0).
Since this contradicts the deﬁnition of ω (y0), we conclude that almost
all y for which w > ω (y) are in the support of pw.
Since pw is absolutely continuous with respect to F, we can write
ω (y) = we
−
R y
y p(w,˜ y)τdF(˜ y),
10where p(w, ˜ y)τdF (˜ y) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of pw. Diﬀer-
entiating with respect to y gives
ω








almost everywhere, which is independent of w. Since
R w
ω(y) p(w,y)dG(w) =
1 for each y, we have p(w,y) = 1
1−G−(ω(y)) which gives the result that
workers apply equally to all ﬁrms whose wage is as high as their market
payoﬀ. ¤
We can now use Proposition 4.1 to provide a characterization of
equilibrium. It implies that we can interpret the market payoﬀ ω (y) as
the lowest wage to which a worker of type y applies Then the inverse
function ω−1 (w) ≡ y∗ (w) has a natural interpretation as the highest
type who applies with positive probability at a wage w.9 When a
worker of type y applies at wage w, he doesn’t need to worry about
workers whose types are lower than his, or workers whose types are such
that their reservation wages exceed w. By Proposition 4.1, the workers
whose types are between y and y∗ (w) are using a relatively simple
application rule that has them applying with equal probability at all
ﬁrms whose wage is above their reservation wage. Substituting the
result in Proposition 4.1 into (3.1) gives the worker’s expected payoﬀ









in order to simplify the formula slightly.
Firms’ payoﬀs can be similiarly simpliﬁed. A ﬁrm who oﬀers wage
w in the support of G will attract workers whose types are between




y k(y′)dF(y′) as just described. The probability that
such a worker applies at wage w is 1 − G− (ω (y)), which gives the





1 − G− (ω (y))
.
9In case ω is not monotonic, use ω−1 (w) = supy {y′ : ω (y′) ≤ w}.
11Adding this up over all the worker types who apply with positive prob-

















for each wage in the support of G.
To simplify the case where w′ < w, begin with type y∗ (w) which
is the highest type of worker who will apply at wage w. Each worker
whose type is below y∗ (w) has a market value below w. The measure
of the set of ﬁrms whose wage is at least as high as their reservation
wage is then 1, and k (y) is simply τ. So this market value is given by











This simple multiplication makes all workers whose types are below
y∗ (w) indiﬀerent between the deviator and the lowest wage in the sup-
port of G.














Finally, substituting the results of Proposition 4.1 into (3.5) gives
the proﬁts for a ﬁrm who oﬀers a wage that is strictly higher than any




















We can now present the main characterization theorem.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose that both the function ι(w,y,x) ≡
v(w,y,x)
w
and its derivative with respect to w are non-decreasing in x. Then a pair
(G,P) is an equilibrium if and only if there is a point y0 and a pair
12of functions ω (y) and h(y) satisfying ω (y0) = w, and G− (ω (y)) =
























This Proposition characterizes the equilibrium in a manner that is
familiar in the directed search literature. The function ω is the market
payoﬀ function of workers, or the market utility function. The worker
of type y0 breaks the set of worker types into two parts. Workers whose
types are at or above y0 have some wage where they can apply and be
hired for sure. For them, the function ω (y) represents their reservation
wage. The worker of type y0 in particular is sure to be hired if he
applies at the lowest wage w oﬀered by any ﬁrm. Worker types below
y0 have a chance of losing out on the job even if they apply at the lowest
wage w. The function h(y) identiﬁes the type of the ﬁrm who oﬀers
worker y’s reservation wage when y ≥ y0, while h(y) = x if y < y0.
The two conditions can be interpreted in the usual way as tangency
conditions. For example, the payoﬀ when a worker applies to a ﬁrm is
a function of the wage that the ﬁrm oﬀers and the highest worker type
who applies that ﬁrm. Each worker type should attain a payoﬀ that
maximizes this function across all wage-highest type pairs that provide
the market payoﬀ to some worker type. Equation (5.1) then expresses
the fact that a worker of type y has an indiﬀerence curve that is tangent
to the market payoﬀ function ω at y.
Similarly, interpret the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function (4.2) as a function of
the wage that it pays and the highest worker type it attracts. The
ﬁrm’s problem is then to choose a wage and highest worker type that
maximizes its proﬁt conditional on providing some worker type his
market payoﬀ. The equation (5.2) expresses the requirement that an
iso-proﬁt curve for a ﬁrm of type h(y) is tangent to the market payoﬀ
function ω (y) at the point (ω (y),y).
It may be worth noting here that despite the tangency, this equi-
librium won’t be eﬃcient. The reason is that this allocation doesn’t
do a good job matching worker and ﬁrm types. To see this, observe
that from (Shimer 2005), an eﬃcient allocation is attained when ﬁrms
can pay workers a wage that depends on their types. Generally, a low
13type worker who applies to a high type ﬁrm in Shimer’s model is re-
warded with a lower wage than that paid to the high type workers.
This focuses low type applications at low type ﬁrms, which limits mis-
matching. Here a low type worker is provided the same wage as a high
type worker, providing the low type worker a much bigger incentive to
apply at high wage ﬁrms. It is this concentration of applications with
the high type ﬁrms which precludes eﬃciency.
Proof. Start with an equilibrium pair P and G. Let w be the lowest
wage in the support of G and y0 = sup{y : ω (y) ≤ w}. From Propo-
sition 4.1, each worker type y must attain his market payoﬀ ω (y) by




y k(y′)dF(y′) = constant
for each w ≥ ω(y). For each worker type y, the derivative of this
expression with respect to w should then be zero at every wage above
































at each y ≥ y0. Fix h(y) to be the solution to G− (ω (y)) = H (h(y)).
The result (5.1) then follows from the deﬁnition of h.
Now use the market payoﬀ function deﬁned by (5.1) and its extension
to types below y0 to simplify the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function. The ﬁrm’s proﬁt

















Observe that choosing w, then ﬁguring out what worker types will apply
by ﬁnding the worker type who has reservation wage w is equivalent to
14choosing the highest worker type that will apply, then setting the wage
equal to that worker type’s reservation wage. Firm proﬁts can then be
written as functions of the highest worker type who applies as









Maximizing (5.6) with respect to y gives the ﬁrst order condition













When G is an equilibrium, the ﬁrm who oﬀers a wage equal to worker
y’s reservation wage is using a best reply. Hence this condition must
hold when evaluated at x = h(y) for each y ≥ y, and this gives (5.2).
To make the argument in the other direction, observe that a solution
to (5.1) holds worker payoﬀ constant as required by the ﬁrst condition
of equilibrium, provide the wage distribution is given by G(ω (y)) =
H (h(y)). Hence (3.7) holds for the density p(w,y) = 1
1−G−(w). The
aggregate distribution P can then be constructed by integrating this
density.
From equation (4.4), it is straightforward to verify that local proﬁt
maximization conditions hold at ω (y) whenever (5.2) holds. It is then
straightforward to verify by brute force that second order conditions
are guaranteed by the assumption that v (w,y,x) is concave in w for
every y. The same approach veriﬁes the second order condition at w0.
Inside the support, the condition (5.2) guarantees that the ﬁrst order
conditions for proﬁt maximization hold when every ﬁrm of type h(y)
oﬀers wage ω (y). If the second order condition fails, then the iso-proﬁt
curve in (w,y) space for ﬁrm h(y) must cross ω at another wage. The
argument is similar whether the wage at this crossing point is higher
or lower than ω (y), so suppose the crossing occurs at a higher wage.
Then, ﬁrm h(y)’s iso-proﬁt curve is strictly steeper than ω at this
higher wage w′. Yet by (5.2) there is some higher type ﬁrm x′ > h(y)




y ιw (w,y′,x)ω′ (y′)dy′
and this ratio is non-decreasing in x by assumption, this leads to a
contradiction. ¤
In this Theorem, y0 is the highest worker type who applies to the
lowest wage in the support of the equilibrium wage distribution. Condi-
tion (5.1) ensures that payoﬀs are constant above at all wages above the
15reservation wage. The advantage of the exponential matching function
is that a reservation wage rule that satisﬁes this single functional equa-
tion ensures the constant payoﬀ condition for all worker types. The
condition (5.2) is the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization - i.e.,
Vw (w,x,G,ω) = 0. The term on the left hand side of the condition is
the marginal gain associated with attracting a higher type when wage
is increased. The term on the right hand side is the marginal cost of
paying a higher wage to all the lower types.
The functional h(y) has a natural interpretation as the lowest type
of the ﬁrm who oﬀers the reservation wage of worker y. From the
type y0 and the functional equations ω and h, the wage distribution is
readily constructed. The lowest wage in the support of the distribution
is ω (y0). Then for each y > y0, G− (ω (y)) = H (h(y)).
6. Examples with Identical Firms
To begin, we will assume that all ﬁrms have the same proﬁt function.
The reason this case is amenable to analysis is because the ﬁrst order
condition (5.2) reduces to a constant proﬁt condition that involves only
the function ω, and a boundary condition. If we begin with a function
ω that satisﬁes this constant proﬁt condition, we can then ﬁnd the
function G that ensures that (5.1) is satisﬁed. If this function is a dis-
tribution function, then we have an equilibrium with a non-degenerate
wage distribution.
Example 6.1. If v (w,y,x) = 1 + αy − w for all x ∈ [x,x], then
there is a degenerate single wage equilibrium with w = 1 + αy −
R y




Proof. Proposition 5.1 applies to the degenerate case since we can set
y0 = y and h(y) = x. To see this, observe that if the wage distribution
is degenerate at some wage w0, then all workers apply at this wage.
Since y0 is the highest type who applies to the lowest wage in the
support, the conclusion y0 = y follows. The function h(y) is supposed
to be the lowest ﬁrm type who oﬀers worker y his reservation wage.
Since all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage, this is x. We then have trivially
from (5.1) ω (y)τF ′ (y) = wτF ′ (y) = ω′ (y).
The ﬁrst order condition (5.2) then becomes (since G− (ω (y)) =
G− (w) = 0)













16Substituting the speciﬁc proﬁt function 1+αy −w then gives the ﬁrst
order condition








which gives the result. ¤
This equilibrium looks very much like any other generic directed
search equilibrium in that a common wage is chosen so that no ﬁrm
has any incentive to increase its wage oﬀer. (Lang and Manove 2003)
prove a similar single wage result with a continuum of worker types
under the assumption that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are independent of worker
types. Their model is a special case of this example in which α = 0.
Substituting α = 0 into (6.1) and solving gives w = e−τ. The result
is derived here by simplifying the functional equations in Proposition
5.1. To see the argument in a more conventional way10, note that
since ﬁrms don’t care who they hire, they simply want to maximize
expected proﬁt. These expected proﬁts are given by 1 − w times the
probability that at least one worker applies, say 1 − e−l. Since ﬁrms
always choose the highest type worker who applies, this means that
e−l is the probability that the lowest type worker is hired if he applies
to the ﬁrm. Since all the ﬁrm cares about is the trading probability,
the equilibrium can be described using the usual market utility story -




the constraint that we−l = we−τ, where we−τ represents the expected
payoﬀ to the lowest worker type when he applies to one of the other
ﬁrms. It is straightforward to check that w can only be a solution to
this problem if w = e−τ as above. When ﬁrms care about worker types
directly, the argument is more subtle since ﬁrms also care about the
highest type who applies at any wage. It is this feature that is captured
by (5.2) in Proposition 5.1.
Example 6.2. Suppose that v (w,y,x) = (αy − w) for all x. Then
a wage distribution can be supported in equilibrium only if F ′ (y) is
decreasing.
Proof. Fix the lowest wage w in the support of the equilibrium distri-
bution and let y0 be the type for whom ω (y0) = w. When ﬁrms have
the same proﬁt function, all wages in the support must yield the same
proﬁt. This is guaranteed by condition (5.2), which after substituting
10I am grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
17the special proﬁt function becomes





















Since this must hold uniformly in y, the derivatives of this expression
with respect to y must also be the same, or
(αy − ω (y))ω
′ (y) + ω (y)(α − ω
′ (y)) = αyω
′ (y).
This gives the simple condition ω′ (y) = α
2. This is the condition that
the market payoﬀ function must have when ω (y) is in the support of the
equilibrium wage distribution in order for ﬁrms proﬁts to be constant








along the support of the equilibrium wage distribution. Since
ω(y)
1−G(ω(y))
is strictly increasing in y, this condition can’t be fulﬁlled unless F ′ (y)
is decreasing. ¤
One implication of this result is that if worker types are uniformly
distributed, then the only equilibrium that can supported with identical
ﬁrms has all ﬁrms oﬀering the same wage.
Example 6.3. Suppose that v (w,x,y) = y − w, and that F (y) =
y (2 − y) with y = 0 and y = 1. Then there is a worker ﬁrm ratio τ0 < 3
2
such that a non-degenerate distribution of wages can be supported
in equilibrium for the economy where the ratio of workers to ﬁrms







The proof of these assertions are in the appendix. This example
illustrates a diﬀerence between this paper and (Lang and Manove 2003)
for which only single wage equilibrium exist with identical ﬁrms. The
diﬀerence is that in this latter reference, ﬁrms don’t care what worker
they hire. The diﬀerences in matching probabilities associated with
higher wages won’t in itself support a distribution of wages. Here,
higher wages can also bring improvements in worker quality which is
what supports the distribution here.
187. Offer Distributions and Duration
These examples illustrate how the functional equations can be used
to analyze equilibrium. They illustrate that equilibrium might not
be unique. With identical ﬁrms, non-degenerate wage distributions
may or may not exist in equilibrium, depending both on equilibrium
selection and primitive. In this section we return to the case where
ﬁrms diﬀer, so that equilibrium wage oﬀer distributions will generally
be non-degenerate. In particular, the focus here is on the relationship
between employment probability and wage. Employment probabilities
at diﬀerent wages are unobservable. However, some insight into this can
be gleaned from unemployment duration. For this section, we imagine
the equilibrium wage distribution G to be a steady state distribution
associated with a repeated version of the model in which a worker of
type y who fails to ﬁnd a job goes into the next period with the same
type, faces the same wage and worker type distribution, so plays the
same mixed strategy again in the next period. To do this properly we
should model all this dynamics. However, for the interpretive results
in this section, this informal interpretation should be suﬃcient.
If the probability Q(y) with which a worker ﬁnds a job is the same
in each period when he is unemployed, then the average number of
periods that will elapse before he ﬁnds a job is just 1
Q(y). This observa-
tion makes it possible to work out the relationship between duration of
unemployment and the wage at which a worker leaves unemployment.
Suppose this duration function is Φ(w) - i.e., Φ(w) is the average un-
employment duration for workers who ﬁnd jobs at wage w.
Since workers apply with equal probability at all openings where the
wage is above their reservation wage, it is possible to work out the
probability that a worker of type y is hired by some ﬁrm. There are
G′ (w) ﬁrms who oﬀer wage w and 1 − G(ω (y)) ﬁrms who oﬀer wages
above the worker’s reservation wage. So the ’probability’ that a worker
applies at wage w is
G′(w)
1−G(ω(y)). The probability of matching with such
a ﬁrm is e
−
R y∗(w)
y k(y′)dF(y′), so the probability that a worker matches if










where wG is the highest wage in the support of G.11 Since the expected
wage is constant for a worker of type y at every wage above ω(y), this
11In this expression the function ω (y) has to be interpreted as the lowest wage
to which a worker of type y applies instead of as his market payoﬀ. This two things









It isn’t immediate that better workers will have higher matching
probabilities or lower durations. The reason is that higher types have
higher reservation wages. So despite the fact that they are more likely
to be hired at any particular ﬁrm than low type workers, they tend to
apply at ﬁrms where there is a lot of high type competition. From the
last equation and the fact that workers’ reservation wages increase in











is an increasing function of the wage w.1213
This function represents the expectation of the ratio of any wage to
the harmonic mean of higher wages in the distribution G. This function
isn’t particularly simple conceptually. Nor is it easy to deduce distribu-
tions for the unobservables that will support this property. However, it
is relatively easy to check. For example, it is straightforward to check
that the equilibrium distribution given in closed form in Example 6.3
has the property that this function is increasing. We explain below how
to check this condition using the accepted wage distribution (which is
easier to observe).
Workers types can’t be observed. What is observable is the actual
duration of workers hired at diﬀerent wages. To establish the ﬁnal
connection we simply have to show that ﬁrms that set high wages and
hire a worker actually end up with better workers i.e., workers with
higher matching probabilities. The probability ˜ F (y0|w) that a worker
hired by the ﬁrm who oﬀers wage w has a type less than or equal to y0
is given by












Note that this probability is conditional on some worker being hired by
the ﬁrm, which explains the denominator. Substituting for k(y) and
can diﬀer for a worker whose type is low enough that there is no wage at which he
will be surely hired.
12See the previous footnote to see why the lower bound of the integration is w.
13Notice that the function ψ must be increasing somewhere. It is obviously less
than 1 when w is at the bottom of the support, and equal to 1 at wG.
20using (5.3), and (5.5) gives an even simpler formulation




This expression is readily seen to be declining in w. The interpretation
is that an increase in the wage moves the distribution function for the
type hired by the ﬁrm to one that ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
the original distribution.
The theorem that follows is a consequence of computing the duration
as Φ(w) = 1 R
Q(y)d ˜ F(y|w).
Proposition 7.1. If ψ(w) is monotonically increasing then the ex-
pected duration of unemployment for a worker hired by a ﬁrm is an
decreasing function of the wage oﬀered by the ﬁrm.
When ψ(w) is increasing, workers who are hired at high wage ﬁrms
will tend on average to have spent less time searching for jobs than
workers who are hired by low wage ﬁrms. This is quite unlike standard
directed search where high wages and long duration must go together.
This prediction is not a particularly strong test of the model, since
the function ψ(w) may not be monotonic. Notice however, that it is a
testable consequence of the model that does not rely on any knowledge
about the distributions of the unobservables.
The expected duration for a worker hired by a ﬁrm oﬀering a wage






using the expression for the density of the type of worker hired by the
ﬁrm that was derived above. It is apparent from this expression that
when ψ(w) is non-monotonic, then there will be no systematic relation-
ship between the wage at which a worker is hired and his probability of
matching measured as his expected duration. Even in this dimension,
the result is quite diﬀerent from the standard directed search model
where wage and employment probability must be inversely related.
Finally, whether duration and wage are inversely related or not, a
simple change of variable in the expression
R
Q(y)d ˜ F (y|w) gives the
following result:14
14I am grateful to Vadim Marmer for pointing out this connection.










The expression on the right is the expected duration function, the
expression on the left is the condition derived from the equilibrium
conditions. The function ψ is a simple function of the wage oﬀer distri-
bution, while Φ(w) is the observed relationship between duration and
exit wage.
One problem with these results is that they are based on the wage of-
fer distribution, which is not observable. The relationship between the
wage oﬀer distribution and the accepted wage distribution is relatively
straightforward since the accepted wage distribution can be computed
from the wage oﬀer distribution using the equilibrium application strat-
egy and probabilities of being hired.
Let G∗ be the observed (or accepted wage distribution). Then
Proposition 7.3. The wage oﬀer distribution G and the accepted wage
distribution are related by
G(w) = G













The proof of this Proposition is in the online appendix. On the right
hand side of this expression, the only unobservable is the payoﬀ to the




. This could be estimated from survey data by
using the worst observed experience, or possibly by using an outside
option like unemployment insurance to deﬁne the lowest attainable
payoﬀ.15 Up to this identifying assumption, this formula can be used
to convert the results of Propositions 7.1 and 7.2 into statements about
the observable accepted wage distribution.
8. Equilibrium of the Worker Application Sub-game
Assertions about payoﬀs in large games are ultimately ad hoc. In
this section we analyze a ﬁnite game to show how the payoﬀs in the
large game come about. The ﬁnite game also makes it possible to
illustrate how the model discussed above diﬀers from some of the other
well known papers involving diﬀerent worker types. In particular in the
15The lowest observed wage will typically exceed the payoﬀ of the lowest worker
type if the worst workers type is so low that he won’t hired for sure even at the
lowest wage.
22ﬁnite model it is easy to see how workers mixed application strategies
diﬀer from the mixing that occurs in models like (Shimer 2005) and (Shi
2002) where wages can be conditioned on worker type. Furthermore the
distinction between two type models like (Lang, Manove, and Dickens
1999) and continuous type models can be made clear. Finally, the ﬁnite
type model illustrates why assortative matching of the sort that occurs
in (Eeckhout and Kircher 2008) cannot occur here.
For this section, there are n workers and m ﬁrms. Each worker’s type
is an independent draw from some common distribution F. Worker
and ﬁrm payoﬀs are as described above. Firm types are assumed to
be common knowledge. Firms set wages, then workers apply. Finally
ﬁrms hire the best worker who applies. The solution concept is perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
To begin, focus on the second part of the process in which work-
ers make their applications. A strategy for worker i in the applica-




i=1 πi = 1
ª
.16 This section analyzes symmetric equilibria
in which every worker uses an application strategy that is a common
function of his or her type. The idea that is fundamental to directed
search is that these application strategies depend on the array of wages
on oﬀer. For the purposes of characterizing the equilibrium in the ap-
plication sub-game associated with a ﬁxed set of wages, the notation
that captures this will be suppressed and we write πj(y) to be the
probability with which each worker whose type is y applies to ﬁrm j.
Since ﬁrms always hire the worker with the highest type who applies,
worker i will match with ﬁrm j in equilibrium so long as every other
worker in the market either has a lower type than he does, or applies
to some other ﬁrm. To calculate this, suppose worker i’s type is y.
The probability that some other worker has type y′ > y and chooses
to come to ﬁrm j is πj (y′)dF (y′). So the probability that this worker
will come and take the job away from worker i is
R y
y πj (y′)dF (y′). The
probability that no other worker comes and takes the job away is










So q (y,wj) is the probability that worker i gets the job at wage wj.
His expected payoﬀ when he applies to ﬁrm j is q (y,wj) multiplied by
the wage wj that the ﬁrm oﬀers.
16We ignore the possibility that a worker might not apply to any ﬁrm since that
is a strictly dominated strategy given the assumptions about payoﬀs.
23This logic can also be used to derive the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function. The
ﬁrm hires the best type who applies. So the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts
are determined by the probability distribution of the highest type who
applies. Fix a type y. The probability that any particular worker either
has a type below y or applies at some other ﬁrm, using the logic above,
is 1−
R y
y πj (y′)dF (y′). The probability that all the workers either have










To say this a diﬀerent way, this is the probability that the highest
type who applies to ﬁrm j is less than or equal to y. The probability
distribution function has a density given by nq (y,wj)πj (y)F ′ (y). In-
tegrating over possible values for this highest type gives the expected




v(wj,y,x)nq (y,wj)πj (y)dF (y).
Notice that the functions π and q implicitly depend on the wages oﬀered
by all the ﬁrms, so these payoﬀ functions describe a game in the usual
way.
It will simplify the argument in this section to assume that wages
are ordered in such a way that w1 6 w2 6 ... 6 wm. In a slight abuse
of notation, refer to an array {yK,...,ym} with yK ≤ yK+1 ≤ ... ≤ ym
as a partition of the set of types. The collection of intervals [yk,yk+1)
along with [y,yK) constitute the sets in this partition.
The unique (symmetric) equilibrium for the application sub-game is
given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 8.1. For any array of wages w1,...wm oﬀered by ﬁrms for
which w1 > 0, there is a partition {yK,...,ym} containing no more
than m intervals, and a set {πk









j if j > k;y ∈ [yk,yk+1)
0 otherwise
is almost everywhere a unique (symmetric) continuation equilibrium












for each j > i.
24Furthermore, the numbers {yk} and {πk
j} depend continuously on the
wages oﬀered by ﬁrms.
There are many indices to keep track of, but the logic is simple
enough. Suppose there are only two ﬁrms oﬀering wages w1 < w2. The
highest worker types apply only to ﬁrm 2. If y is close enough to y,
then even if the other worker is expected to apply at wage w2 for sure,
the ﬁrst worker will get the job with probability F (y). If F (y)w2 > w1
then there is no point applying at wage w1. This immediately describes
the cutoﬀ point ym = y2 to be the point where F (y2)w2 = w1. This
gives the constant π2
2 = 1.
The main content of the theorem comes in the description of what
happens to the types below y2. The theorem says that all types below
y2 use exactly the same application probabilities π1
1 and π1
2 which are









and the fact that π1
1 and π1














w1+w2 y < y2
1 otherwise.
The complete proof is included in the appendix. The theorem is hard
to state because each worker type has to assign a diﬀerent probability
of applying to every diﬀerent wage. The Lemma shows that Bayesian
equilibrium puts three kinds of structure on these strategies. First,
it says that if a worker sends an application with positive probability
to a ﬁrm oﬀering a wage wk, then he or she must send applications
to every higher wage as well. This is the ’reservation wage’ part of
the story, since the worker has to decide what is the lowest wage to
which he will send an application. Second, the formula (8.2) along
with the requirement that the application probabilities sum to one,
then determines the entire application strategy from the reservation
wage. Third, and critically important for most of the technical results
in the paper, the Lemma partitions the worker type space into intervals,
then says that all workers whose type is in the same interval will use
exactly the same application probabilities.
25To see why mixing has to occur, start with the elite types in the
interval [ym,y]. As in the two ﬁrm example described above, they
apply only to the highest wage ﬁrm. They might as well, since their
types are so high they are very likely to be hired at every wage no
matter what the other workers do. The ’marginal’ worker type in this
elite group has type ym. He is just indiﬀerent between applying at the
highest wage ﬁrm and getting the job if it happens to be the case that
there are no other elite workers, and applying at the second highest
wage and getting that job for sure.
Now consider a worker whose type is just slightly below ym. If the
only workers who apply to the highest wage ﬁrm are workers in the elite
group, then this infra marginal type has the same chance of ﬁnding a
job with the highest wage ﬁrm as does the worker of type ym - he
will get the job if none of the other workers has an elite type. Yet if
he applies at the second highest wage, there is always a chance that
he will lose out to a worker whose type is in between his type and
ym. Since the worker of type ym is indiﬀerent between the highest
and second highest wage, the worker with the lower type must strictly
prefer to apply at the highest wage. So to support an equilibrium,
these infra marginal workers whose types are slightly below ym must
face the same competition from other infra marginal workers at the
highest wage ﬁrm as they do at the second highest wage ﬁrm. In other
words, infra marginal workers must apply with positive probability at
the highest wage ﬁrm. Exactly this same logic extends down through
all the lower types.
This explains the diﬀerence between models with a continuum of
types and models like (Lang, Manove, and Dickens 1999) where there
are only two types.17 As explained above, it is the infra marginal
workers who break up any potential equilibrium where workers sort by
type. When there are only two types, as there are in (Lang, Manove,
and Dickens 1999), there are no infra marginal types, so complete sort-
ing can be supported when the lower type is just indiﬀerent between
applying at the low wage and the high wage. The addition of a third
worker type in their model without a corresponding ﬁrm type to hire
it, would lead to an equilibrium in the application subgame that more
closely resembles the equilibrium described here.
The uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium also explains why assorta-
tive matching cannot be supported in equilibrium, as it is in (Eeckhout
and Kircher 2008). The diﬀerence between the two models is that
17Two types is a very natural assumption for their problem.
26(Eeckhout and Kircher 2008) assume that the ’proposer’ (or wage set-
ter here) doesn’t care directly about the types of the parties involved
in a transaction. This same property could be accomplished here by
changing the oﬀer that the ﬁrm makes from a wage to a demand for
proﬁt - i.e., whoever it hires the ﬁrm requires the same proﬁt. The ﬁrm
no longer cares which worker it hires, and workers will naturally match
assortatively (under the payoﬀ restrictions that they provide). Their
approach is similar to the (Shimer 2005)-(Shi 2002) approach which
makes the wage contingent on worker type. Yet feasible contracts in
(Eeckhout and Kircher 2008) are more restricted than in (Shimer 2005)-
(Shi 2002) since ﬁrms cannot vary wages arbitrarily across types.
Models like (Shimer 2005) or (Shi 2002) where ﬁrm can condition
wages on type also support mixed application strategies, but for a very
diﬀerent reasons. As in (Shi 2002) suppose there are only two types
of ﬁrms and two types of workers. High type ﬁrms oﬀer high wages to
attract high type workers. However, by the nature of directed search,
there is a chance they will nonetheless end up without applications.
Firms can raise their proﬁts by setting a higher wage in order to attract
lower quality applicants, who they will only hire in the event that no
high quality applicants apply. The higher wage for lower quality is
needed to compensate the low quality workers for the low chance they
will be hired. So mixing among ﬁrms of diﬀerent wages is used to
support the equilibrium in the wage setting part of the game.
9. Limit Payoffs
Finally, we show the sense in which the large game payoﬀs we de-
scribed in the continuum model in the ﬁrst part of the paper are limits
of payoﬀs in ﬁnite games. There are a couple of reasons for doing this.
First, the matching probabilities and payoﬀ functions used in the con-
tinuum model are subtly diﬀerent than those used in the conventional
directed search literature. For instance, matching probabilities aren’t
based on the queue size at the ﬁrm in the usual way. Furthermore, pay-
oﬀs associated with wage oﬀers that exceed all wages in the support
of the existing distribution of wages involve outcomes in which ﬁrms
sometimes choose the best applicant, and sometimes select randomly
from a group of highest quality applicants. Whether or not these func-
tions seem plausible descriptions of payoﬀ, they are essentially ad hoc.
The limit theorem provided here justiﬁes these payoﬀ functions.
Furthermore, the symmetric continuation equilibrium in worker ap-
plications strategies is unique, this limit theorem shows not only that
the heuristic descriptions of payoﬀs given in the continuum model are
27reasonable approximations to payoﬀs in large ﬁnite games, it also shows
that these payoﬀ functions are the only ones that can be used to ap-
proximate payoﬀs in large ﬁnite versions of the game.
Lastly, the limit results are designed to provide payoﬀs for all distri-
butions of wages, not just those associated with equilibrium. So they
do not directly address sequences of equilibrium in the wage setting
part of the game. However, it is straightforward to use these results to
show that every sequence of pure strategy equilibrium in ﬁnite versions
of the game converges to an equilibrium in the continuum game as we
have described it above. All this requires is a restriction on ﬁrms’ pay-
oﬀ functions that ensure that they don’t vary in ’unreasonable’ ways
with worker types.18 The proof is by contradiction. If convergence
fails, then the limit distribution of wages will have the property that
a measurable set of ﬁrms will want to deviate. Then, provided payoﬀs
aren’t too sensitive to type and wage distributions, then ﬁrms will want
to deviate in large ﬁnite versions of the game as well. The details of
this straightforward but lengthy argument are left out in the interest
of brevity.
The theorem:
Theorem 9.1. Let G be a distribution of wages, w a wage in the sup-
port of G oﬀered by a ﬁrm of type x. Let Gn be a sequence of distribu-
tions with ﬁnite support that converges weakly to G. Then worker and
ﬁrm payoﬀs in the continuation equilibrium in which other ﬁrms oﬀer
wages given by the mass points in Gn converge to the payoﬀ functions
given by (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) given in Section 3 .
The complete proof of this theorem is in the on-line appendix.
10. Conclusion
This paper illustrates how a directed search model can be used to
model wage competition among ﬁrms who can’t condition wage pay-
ments on worker type. Part of this involves adjusting the directed
search model to allow for rich variation in the types of workers and
ﬁrms. This improves on existing models that use extensive symmetry
assumptions that sometimes force the models to behave in counter-
factual ways. In the variant proposed here, rich distributions of ﬁrm
and worker characteristics can be incorporated.
The directed search model does impose some structure on the data.
Surprisingly it restricts the relationship between the wage distribution
18For example, if the family of payoﬀ functions for a ﬁrm determined by the set
of worker types is equi-continuous.
28and the function relating unemployment duration and exit wage. Some
wage distributions (the uniform being an example) have the property
that workers who leave unemployment at high wages must also have
shorter unemployment duration. This prediction is distinctly diﬀerent
from standard directed search models where unemployment duration
and wage must be positively related.
The driving force in the model presented here is the equilibrium of
the workers’ application sub-game. Contrary to what one might expect,
low quality workers do not restrict their applications to low wage ﬁrms.
On the contrary, low quality workers make applications at all kinds of
diﬀerent wages. The higher the unobservable quality of the worker, the
more discriminating the worker is in the wages at which he applies.
It is this property that breaks the strong relationship between wage
and unemployment probability. Higher quality workers are more likely,
everything else constant, to be hired by ﬁrms. High quality workers also
apply to higher wage ﬁrms on average. In this sense high wages and
short duration should be related. This relationship is not unambiguous
however. As a workers quality rises, he is more likely to be hired at
any given ﬁrm, but he will also restrict his applications to ﬁrms whose
wages are higher. This by itself reduces the probability of employment
because high wage ﬁrms have bigger queues - the usual directed search
story.
Finally, the paper suggests how observable data on wages and dura-
tion can be used to provide a testable implication of the model.
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